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Abstract 
Psychological research has offered valuable insights into how to combat misinformation. 
The studies conducted to date, however, have three limitations. First, pre-emptive 
(“prebunking”) and retroactive (“debunking”) interventions have mostly been examined in 
parallel, and thus it is unclear which of these two predominant approaches is more effective. 
Second, there has been a focus on misinformation that is explicitly false, but misinformation that 
uses literally true information to mislead is common in the real world. Finally, studies have 
relied mainly on questionnaire measures of reasoning, neglecting behavioural impacts of 
misinformation and interventions. To offer incremental progress towards addressing these three 
issues, we conducted an experiment (N = 735) involving misinformation on fair trade. We 
contrasted the effectiveness of prebunking versus debunking and the impacts of implied versus 
explicit misinformation, and incorporated novel measures assessing consumer behaviours (i.e., 
willingness-to-pay; information seeking; online misinformation promotion) in addition to 
standard questionnaire measures. In general, we found debunking to be more effective than 
prebunking, although both were able to reduce misinformation reliance. We also found that 
individuals tended to rely more on explicit than implied misinformation both with and without 
interventions.   
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A Comparison of Prebunking and Debunking Interventions for Implied versus Explicit 
Misinformation 
Misinformation—information that is ostensibly presented as true but is in fact false or 
misleading—often influences memory and reasoning even after being corrected. This 
phenomenon is known as the continued influence effect (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; for a recent 
meta-analysis, see Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019). The continued influence of misinformation can 
result in substantial costs across a range of domains, including politics, public health, and climate 
change (for reviews, see Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2017). Although the 
continued influence literature has been able to provide valuable insights into how to mitigate 
such costs, it has three weaknesses revolving around the proposed interventions, the types of 
misinformation investigated, and the outcomes typically assessed. These weaknesses may limit 
the broad applicability of current recommendations for combatting misinformation. The present 
study was designed to shed some light on all three issues and offer incremental progress towards 
addressing them more thoroughly. In what follows, we consider each of these weaknesses in turn 
before outlining how our study was designed to address them. 
Interventions 
Interventions to counteract misinformation based on the continued influence literature 
can be grouped into two broad categories that have, to date, been mostly examined in parallel. 
The first approach is prebunking, which aims to pre-emptively reduce the persuasiveness of 
misinformation before it is encoded. One way that prebunking can be achieved is via 
interventions derived from inoculation theory (Compton, 2013; McGuire, 1964). Inoculation 
involves (a) a warning of an impending threat to a recipient’s existing beliefs, designed to 
motivate subsequent counterarguing, and (b) a refutation of an example piece of misinformation 
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that highlights one or more fallacies and techniques typical of misdirection attempts, designed to 
provide the recipient with counterarguing tools. Inoculations were originally developed to foster 
resistance against persuasive messages more generally, but have in recent years garnered 
attention as an effective way to counter misinformation more specifically (e.g., van der Linden et 
al., 2020). For example, explaining how the tobacco industry recruited spokespeople with only a 
veneer of expertise to cast doubt on the science linking smoking to lung cancer was shown to 
shield individuals from the influence of climate-change misinformation involving the same “fake 
experts” strategy (Cook et al., 2017).   
The second approach is debunking, which aims to retroactively reduce reliance on 
misinformation by correcting it once it has been encoded. Although corrections are rarely 
completely effective at countering the continued influence of misinformation, several debunking 
strategies have been identified that make corrections more effective. For instance, corrections 
can be made more effective by using a trustworthy source (Ecker & Antonio, 2020; Guillory & 
Geraci, 2013) and by making salient the inconsistency between misinformation and facts, which 
aids knowledge revision (Kendeou et al., 2019). Other recommendations have included 
providing additional factual information to explain why the misinformation is false and to 
provide an alternative interpretation (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Swire et al., 2017), as well as 
drawing attention to any misleading strategies that misinformants1 employ (Cook et al., 2018; 
MacFarlane et al., 2018). Optimized-debunking formats that take these recommendations into 
account have been found to be superior in reducing reliance on misinformation compared to 
 
1 The term disinformants—agents that purposefully craft and spread false information to 
deceive—may be more appropriate here. However, we opted for the more encompassing 
misinformants to accommodate the fact that there could be inadvertent usage of misleading 
strategies.    
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standard approaches that often involve only brief or tentative corrections (Ecker et al., 2020; 
MacFarlane et al., 2020; Paynter et al., 2019).   
Although a recent meta-analysis suggested that prebunking may be less effective than 
debunking, this was based on effect sizes from a small and unbalanced sample of studies that did 
not directly contrast the two approaches (prebunking: K = 6; debunking: K = 56; Walter & 
Murphy, 2018). There are only a few exceptions in which the two approaches are directly 
compared, which have returned mixed results. On the one hand, Jolley and Douglas (2017) 
reported significant effects of prebunking but not debunking of vaccine misinformation, and 
Bolsen and Druckman (2015) found that prebunking was more effective than debunking in 
countering the politicization of scientific facts. On the other hand, Vraga et al. (2020) found that 
debunking was successful regardless of whether it focussed on providing factual information or 
on highlighting the logical flaws of misinformation messages, whereas prebunking was only 
effective when it focussed on logical flaws. Similarly, Brashier et al. (2021) found debunking 
was superior to prebunking in terms of improving participants’ subsequent ability to discern true 
and false headlines. Note, however, that both prebunking and debunking in the Brashier et al. 
study only involved “false” tags that simply indicated that a given headline was false. That is, 
their interventions did not expose misleading strategies or present accurate information in 
conjunction with the interventions, unlike studies testing best-practice recommendations. 
Accordingly, it is unclear which approach, if any, is more effective (and if so, under what 
circumstances), particularly when more sophisticated misinformation and intervention 
techniques are adopted. 
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Misinformation Types 
A second limitation of the existing literature is that studies often examine only explicit 
misinformation—that is, misinformation that can be unequivocally declared false (e.g., a 
particular factor such as negligence being ruled out as the cause of a fire; Johnson & Seifert, 
1994). Yet, implied misinformation—information that is misleading but falls short of literal 
falsity—is common in the real world, as marketeers, politicians, and individuals with ulterior 
motives may strive for plausible deniability by using information to mislead that is literally true 
(e.g., Brown, 2013; Chestnut & Markman, 2018). In fact, even well-intentioned educational 
campaigns can generate implied misinformation. For example, the American Diabetes 
Association website states that the answer to the question “Does eating too much sugar cause 
diabetes?” is “not so simple”, and provides detailed explanations regarding how diabetes may be 
caused by other factors such as genetics. However, while these other explanations are all true in 
isolation, they are potentially misleading since they cause individuals to underestimate the causal 
role of a high-sugar diet (Powell et al., 2020).  
Concerningly, implied misinformation may potentially be harder to counteract than 
explicit misinformation. When exposed to implied misinformation, recipients often generate their 
own inferences, which can lead to activation of related schemas and richer, more enduring 
integration of misleading content in memory (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). Moreover, during 
attempted correction, explicit misinformation can be directly refuted, making salient the conflict 
between falsehood and factual correction by fostering their co-activation in memory, which is 
known to aid knowledge revision (Kendeou et al., 2019). This process may be more difficult 
with implied misinformation, because individuals may be less able to notice specific points of 
discrepancy between false and factual information (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016; see also Ecker et al., 
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2014). Although prebunking may be more effective in this regard, because it aims to pre-
emptively reduce the persuasiveness of misinformation and does not depend on knowledge 
revision at time of correction, no study has empirically tested this possibility. 
Outcome Measures 
Finally, research exploring the continued influence effect has tended to focus only on the 
underlying cognitive processes, leaving behavioural impacts underexplored. Indeed, in a typical 
study, participants are presented with misinformation on a certain topic (e.g., the cause of a fire), 
which is (or is not) corrected. Then, participants’ memory and inferences regarding the topic are 
assessed using a questionnaire with either open-ended questions (e.g., What might be a good 
headline for a report about the fire?) or rating scales that can be more or less direct (e.g., 
Negligence contributed to the fire; strongly agree – strongly disagree; Connor-Desai & Reimers, 
2019). This approach has significantly advanced understanding of the continued influence effect, 
as results show that participants continue to refer to outdated information despite remembering 
the correction. This means that the reliance is not simply a consequence of failing to notice or 
remember corrective details (Ecker et al., 2015).  
However, one consequence of the above is that the real-world impacts of the continued 
influence effect and the proposed interventions’ may, to some extent, rest on the assumption that 
patterns assessed at the cognitive level will translate well to the behavioural level. Such an 
assumption should not be taken for granted, as attitudes and beliefs may only weakly and 
indirectly predict behaviours (e.g., McEachan et al., 2011). Considering that changes to 
behaviours are often the actual outcomes of interest (e.g., reducing demand for ineffective health 
products, increasing demand for sustainable products, or reducing the sharing of misinformation 
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on social media platforms), it is critical that this gap be addressed (Hamby et al., 2020; 
MacFarlane et al., 2020). 
The Present Study 
The aim of this study was, thus, to investigate the following three questions: Is 
prebunking or debunking more effective in reducing the impacts of misinformation? Is implied 
or explicit misinformation more challenging to correct? Will the effects of misinformation and 
best-practice interventions on measures of cognition extend to measures of behaviour?   
To this end, we presented participants with articles containing either implied or explicit 
misinformation designed to alter consumer behaviours regarding fair-trade products. A no-
misinformation group was also included, with participants receiving an article that contained 
only neutral information about fair trade. We then provided participants with either no 
intervention, a prebunking treatment prior to reading the misinformation, or a post-exposure 
debunking of the misinformation. In addition to the standard inference questionnaire, we also 
examined participants’ willingness to purchase products targeted by the misinformation (i.e., 
fair-trade products), using two measures: bids in hypothetical product auctions, and an end-of-
survey question asking if participants would like to receive additional information on where to 
purchase fair-trade products. Finally, we assessed participants’ behaviour when tasked to 
compose a social-media post (i.e., the extent to which their posts expressed sentiments consistent 
with the misinformation and would thus promote misinformation when shared online). We tested 
four pre-registered hypotheses, predicting that (1) both implied and explicit misinformation 
exposure would increase participants’ reliance on misinformation; (2) both prebunking and 
debunking would be effective in reducing misinformation reliance; (3) implied misinformation 
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would be more difficult to counteract than explicit misinformation; and (4) prebunking would be 
more effective than debunking for implied misinformation. 
Method 
The experiment adopted a 2 (misinformation type: implied vs. explicit) × 3 (intervention 
type: no intervention vs. prebunking vs. debunking) plus control between-subjects design. Ethics 
approval was granted by [blinded for peer review]. The experiment was pre-registered at 
https://osf.io/dktnu/?view_only=de4f642566ad4f36aa810ec444e00bfc. 
Participants 
A total of 735 US-based participants were recruited online through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The minimum eligibility criteria were set at 97% approval rate with 
at least 5,000 prior tasks completed. As regards to sampling strategy, we first estimated a target 
of 100 participants per cell based on prior research and resource constraints. We then conducted 
a simulation-based power analysis using the R package Superpower (Lakens & Caldwell, 2021). 
Results suggested our target sample would produce power of at least 80% at the standard alpha 
level of α = .05, assuming true effect sizes as large as our most conservative estimate (i.e., 
ordinal interaction with ηp2 = .02). The sample size of 735 participants was calculated by 
extrapolating this to incorporate the control condition and to account for potential missing data. 
Retaining approximately equal group sizes, participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
seven conditions.  
Materials 
Target articles. The articles for control, implied misinformation, and explicit 
misinformation conditions were all on the topic of fair trade. The control article contained only 
basic descriptive information about fair trade. The implied-misinformation article built on the 
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no-misinformation article but included the use of misleading strategies. In particular, fake 
experts and anecdotes were employed to nudge participants towards thinking that fair trade 
benefits only corrupt middlemen. It did not include literal falsity but instead stopped at the claim 
being insinuated, leaving participants to draw their own inferences. By contrast, in the explicit-
misinformation article, the false claims were stated unequivocally. See Table 1 for examples of 
critical variations and the Supplement for all presented articles.  
Table 1 
Examples of Critical Variations Across the Target Articles 
Target Article Excerpt   
Control “Traders need to guarantee farmers a minimum price regardless of market 
value, and consumers need to show their support by purchasing products 
with Fair Trade labels, usually at a higher price than regular products.” 
Implied 
Misinformation 
“Recent evidence suggests that farmers often incur additional time and 
costs to obtain and comply with Fair-Trade certification—but not all the 
extra money that consumers spend goes to them. Why do you think large 
organizations are competing to be the middlemen for Fair Trade? Who 
benefits the most? Something needs to change.” 
  “I have an acquaintance who's an executive at a Fair Trade intermediary 
organization. Since starting the job, she has bought a few houses and even a 
beachfront property in Cape Cod.” 
Explicit 
Misinformation 
“Recent evidence suggests that farmers often incur additional time and 
costs to obtain and comply with Fair-Trade certification—but not all the 
extra money that consumers spend goes to them. Why do you think large 
organizations are competing to be the middlemen for Fair Trade? Who 
benefits the most? It’s not the producers, that’s for sure—Fair Trade is a 
big rip-off and up to 95% of the extra money is just soaked up by the 
bureaucracy and intermediary parties. Something needs to change.” 
  “I have an acquaintance who’s an executive at a Fair Trade intermediary 
organization. Since starting the job, she has bought a few houses and even a 
beachfront property in Cape Cod. It’s the middlemen who profit, while the 
farmers supplying the actual goods barely get anything.” 
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Intervention articles. The content of intervention articles was identical in prebunking 
and debunking conditions; the only difference was the time-point at which the intervention was 
presented. The intervention was based on best-practice recommendations from the continued 
influence literature (i.e., it highlighted a trustworthy source, warned of circulating 
misinformation, highlighted the inconsistency between misinformation and facts, provided 
additional information, and exposed misleading techniques via examples). It targeted common 
elements found in both implied and explicit misinformation articles. See Table 2 for details.  
Table 2 
Examples of Techniques Used Across the Intervention Articles 
Intervention Technique Excerpt   
Highlight a trustworthy 
source 




“…, misinformation from fake experts and anecdotes has been 
circulating, claiming that Fair Trade is a scam.” 
Make salient the 
discrepancy between 
misinformation and 
facts, and provide 
additional information 
“One of the false claims about Fair Trade is that most money 
gets taken by middlemen. That is simply not true. Of course, no 
system is perfect, and there may be individual cases where Fair 
Trade delivers no huge benefit. However, we need to look at the 
actual evidence! In a recent large-scale study of producers …” 
Expose misleading 
techniques 
“Fake experts are commentators who either lack relevant 
expertise or are biased because they have a vested interest. For 
example, in the 1930-40s, the tobacco industry engaged 
physicians for advertising purposes. They continued to mislead 
the public … Now, this technique is being used again to cast 
doubt on Fair Trade by industry-funded think tanks with vested 
interests.” 
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  “Anecdotes are personal experiences or isolated examples that 
can appear convincing at first glance, but can misrepresent the 
broader evidence. People love stories and anecdotes because they 
are relatable, so we are often influenced by them even though we 
shouldn’t be.” 
Dependent measures.  
References-To-Misinformation Questionnaire. We used a point-allocation questionnaire 
to assess the extent to which participants refer to misinformation in response to inference 
questions (Connor Desai & Reimers, 2019). The questionnaire included questions such as 
“Consumers who buy Fair Trade products are ...”, with the response options “Supporting the 
farmers”; “Listening to the government”; “Being taken advantage of”; and “Helping society”. 
There was a total of five questions, and participants were told that, for each question, they had 10 
points to allocate to the options that they prefer. For instance, one could allocate five points to 
“Supporting the farmers”, two points to “Helping society”, and three points to “Being taken 
advantage of”, or instead allocate all 10 points to just one preferred option. The points allocated 
to the misinformation-consistent options (i.e., “Being taken advantage of” in the current 
example) across all questions were summed to create a single references-to-misinformation 
measure. The measure thus had a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 50, with greater 
scores indicating greater reliance on misinformation. 
Willingness-to-Purchase. To assess participants’ willingness to purchase fair-trade 
products, we included two measures. The first measure was a willingness-to-pay measure using 
an experimental auction (see Kagel & Levin, 2011; MacFarlane et al., 2018). The auction 
included a sequence of five fair-trade products—blueberries, orange juice, peanut butter, 
watermelon, and coffee—presented in a randomized order. Each product was displayed on a new 
screen accompanied by a picture of the product, and participants were asked to imagine that they 
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had been provided with a $4.99 endowment to bid on each product. Participants were asked to 
bid in dollars and cents, with b ∈ (0, 4.99). They were told their bids would be compared against 
a random number r ∈ (0, 4.99) in each round, and they would purchase the products for rounds in 
which their bids were equal to or greater than the random number, b ≥ r, by paying their bid 
amount, and they would keep the remainder of the hypothetical endowment they chose not to 
bid. They knew for rounds in which their bid amount was less than the random amount, b < r, 
they would not purchase the product and get to keep the full amount of their hypothetical 
endowment. Participants were asked to assume for each product they could find a use for it, have 
the capacity to use it, and there was nothing else preventing them from purchasing the product 
(e.g., a dislike or allergy). Participants’ bids across products were summed to create a single 
composite measure of willingness-to-pay. The measure had a minimum score of 0 and maximum 
score of 24.95, with lower scores suggesting greater reliance on misinformation. Willingness-to-
pay measures elicited using similar auction formats have previously been shown to be 
comparable to those elicited under incentivized conditions (i.e., when participants bid with real 
monetary endowment for physical products; MacFarlane et al., 2020). 
The second measure was an end-of-survey question designed to assess willingness-to-
seek additional information (“Thank you, you have completed the questionnaire. Would you like 
to receive additional information on where you can purchase Fair Trade products online and in 
stores?”). Participants were given the option to choose between “Yes (receive additional 
information)” or “No (end survey now)”. This formed the binary willingness-to-seek measure. 
Participants that chose to receive additional information were provided with a list of fair-trade 
resources before proceeding to the debrief.  
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Social-Media Behaviour. The task involved participants composing a tweet (i.e., a social 
media post limited to 240 characters) about fair trade. Participants were reminded to write their 
posts as if for their actual social-media account, and that their friends, family, and followers 
would be reading their post. The raw text data was used as input for an exploratory sentiment 
analysis using the Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner tool (VADER) to return a 
sentiment score via the R package vader. VADER was chosen for its ability to account for rules 
that suggest changes in valence strength (e.g., intensifiers and contrastive conjunctions), and its 
“gold standard” lexicon that has demonstrated comparable or greater accuracy than human raters 
when applied to short-format social-media data like tweets (Hutto & Gilbert, 2015). The 
resulting tweet-sentiment scores ranged from -1 to 1. As the misinformation in the current study 
aimed to denigrate fair trade, lower sentiment scores represented greater reliance on 
misinformation. Participants’ tweets were also manually coded 1 (if consistent with the 
misinformation), 0 (if ambiguous or neutral), and -1 (if inconsistent with the misinformation) to 
create a propensity-to-promote-misinformation measure. An additional coder coded one-fourth 
of the sample to assess inter-rater reliability, which was found to be satisfactory (Cohen’s κ 
= .84). Disagreements between coders were resolved via discussion. See Supplement for 
examples of tweets and exploratory topic modelling.  
Procedure 
The experiment was run using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). First, 
participants provided informed consent after reading an ethics-approved information sheet. They 
were then presented with the article that corresponded to their assigned condition. This was 
followed by the experimental auction, the inference questionnaire, the social-media task, and the 
information-seeking question. The study concluded with a debrief that made clear which (if any) 
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statements in the presented article were false, and included web-links to resources for 
participants should they wish to learn more about fair trade. The study took approximately 11 
minutes.  
Results 
First, to provide an initial test of our hypotheses, as well as a “sanity-check”, planned 
comparisons were conducted on references-to-misinformation, willingness-to-pay, and tweet-
sentiment scores. Results are summarised in Table 3. The control condition was contrasted 
against the implied and explicit misinformation conditions, respectively, to test for the effects of 
misinformation (top two rows of Table 3); control was contrasted against the prebunking and 
debunking conditions to test for continued influence effects (bottom four rows of Table 3). 
Results suggested that both misinformation types increased participants’ reliance on 
misinformation in the expected direction across dependent variables, with explicit 
misinformation returning larger effect sizes than implied misinformation. Results also suggested 
that debunking was better able to counteract misinformation than prebunking, as conditions in 
which participants received the debunking generally returned smaller continued influence effects 
than when participants received prebunking.  




Planned Comparisons for References-To-Misinformation, Willingness-To-Pay, and Tweet-Sentiment 
Contrast Ref.-To-Misinformation Willingness-to-Pay Tweet-Sentiment 
 t-ratio p-value d t-ratio p-value d t-ratio p-value d 
Effect of Implied Misinformation  10.03 < .001 1.39 -1.59 .113 0.22 -2.69 .007 0.37 
Effect of Explicit Misinformation 11.22 < .001 1.54 -2.67 .008 0.37 -5.47 < .001 0.75 
CIE of Implied Misinformation (Prebunking) 3.93 < .001 0.54 -0.60 .548 0.08 -2.43 .015 0.33 
CIE of Implied Misinformation (Debunking) 1.97 .049 0.27 -1.08 .282 0.15 -0.45 .653 0.06 
CIE of Explicit Misinformation (Prebunking) 5.30 < .001 0.73 -2.59 .010 0.36 -2.48 .013 0.34 
CIE of Explicit Misinformation (Debunking) 4.77 < .001 0.67 -0.08 .937 0.01 -0.87 .385 0.12 
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Figure 1. Bar plots showing mean references-to-misinformation across intervention and 
misinformation types. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line represents 
mean of the no-misinformation control condition. 
Next, we excluded the no-misinformation control condition to test the remaining 
hypotheses. For the references-to-misinformation measure, a misinformation type (implied vs. 
explicit) × intervention type (no intervention vs. prebunking vs. debunking) between-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted (see Figure 1). This revealed a significant main effect of misinformation 
type, F(1, 625) = 8.48, p = .004, ηp2 = .01, as well as a significant main effect of intervention 
type, F(2, 625) = 53.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. The interaction was non-significant, 
F(2, 625) = 0.78, p = .461, ηp2 = .0022. Post-hoc tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed 
 
2 For completeness, we note that there was no significant difference between prebunking and 
debunking when isolating implied misinformation conditions for references-to-misinformation, 
t(625) = 1.830, p = 0.339, willingness-to-pay, t(625) = 0.49, p = 1.000, tweet-sentiment, t(625) = 
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that, across misinformation types and relative to no intervention, both debunking and prebunking 
significantly reduced participants’ number of references to misinformation, with t(625) = -9.60, 
p = < .001, d = .89, and t(625) = -8.08, p = < .001, d = .73, respectively. The difference between 
debunking and prebunking conditions was not significant, t(625) = -1.61, p = .108, d = .28.  
 
Figure 2. Bar plots showing mean willingness-to-pay across intervention and misinformation 
types. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line represents mean of the no-
misinformation control condition. 
Turning to participants’ willingness to purchase fair-trade products, we first analysed the 
willingness-to-pay data in a two-way ANOVA (see Figure 2). There was no significant main 
effect of misinformation type, F(1, 625) = 1.46, p = .228; ηp2 = .002, no significant main effect 
 
-1.91, p = 0.452, or propensity-to-promote-misinformation, z-ratio = 2.25, p = 0.123. The full set 
of contrasts can be found in the Supplement. 
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of intervention type, F(2, 625) = 2.50, p = .083; ηp2 = .008, and no significant interaction, 
F(2, 625) = 2.40, p = .091; ηp2 = .008. For willingness-to-seek information on fair-trade products, 
we analysed the data with logistic regression models. A likelihood-ratio test revealed that, 
compared to a null model with only intercept, a model with both misinformation and intervention 
types as predictors did not significantly improve model fit, p = .55, MacFadden’s R2 = .009. 
 
Figure 3. Bar plots showing mean tweet-sentiment across intervention and misinformation types. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line represents mean of the no-
misinformation control condition. 
Finally, for social-media behaviours, a two-way ANOVA on tweet-sentiment scores (see 
Figure 3) revealed a significant main effect of intervention type, F(2, 625) = 10.81, p < .001; 
ηp2 = .03. However, there was no significant main effect of misinformation type, 
F(1, 625) = 3.30, p = .070; ηp2 = .005, and no significant interaction, F(2, 625) = 2.01, p = .135; 
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ηp2 = .006. Collapsed across misinformation types, post-hoc tests with Holm-Bonferroni 
correction revealed that debunking resulted in more positive sentiments compared to the no-
intervention condition, t(625) = 4.65, p = <.001, d = .46, as well as compared to the prebunking 
condition, t(625) = 2.44, p = .030, d = .24. There was also a significant difference between 
prebunking and no-intervention conditions, with prebunking resulting in more positive 
sentiments, t(625) = 2.23, p = .030, d = .22.  
We analysed the propensity-to-promote-misinformation measure (see Figure 4) using 
cumulative-link ordinal regression models that (1) included only an intercept term, (2) 
additionally included misinformation type as a predictor, (3) additionally included intervention 
type as a predictor, and (4) additionally included an interaction term. The term for 
misinformation type significantly improved model fit, 𝜒2(1) = 5.73, p = .016 (Model 2 vs. 
Model 1), as did the term for intervention type, 𝜒2(2) = 74.41, p < .001 (Model 3 vs. Model 2). 
However, the addition of an interaction term did not result in a statistically significant 
improvement in fit, 𝜒2(2) = 3.99, p = .136 (Model 4 vs. Model 3). Post-hoc tests based on the full 
model with Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed that, when collapsed across intervention types, 
explicit misinformation resulted in greater propensity-to-promote-misinformation than implied 
misinformation, z-ratio = 2.44, p = .015. When collapsed across misinformation types, both 
prebunking and debunking significantly reduced propensity-to-promote misinformation relative 
to no-intervention, z-ratio = -6.29, p < .001, and z-ratio = -8.15, p < .001, respectively. 
Debunking was also found to result in lower propensity-to-promote misinformation relative to 
prebunking, z-ratio = -2.12, p = .034. 
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Figure 4. Point-estimate plots showing predicted probabilities of response options across 
intervention and misinformation types. Responses were coded 1 if consistent with the 
misinformation, 0 if ambiguous or neutral, and -1 if inconsistent with the misinformation. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
Discussion 
The continued influence literature has, to date, three major limitations. First, as best-
practice recommendations on prebunking and debunking have mostly been examined separately, 
it remains unclear which approach, if any, is more effective. Second, studies have tended to 
focus only on explicit misinformation, leaving underexplored the effects of implied 
misinformation that uses literally-true information to mislead. Finally, the outcomes assessed 
have typically been restricted to questionnaire measures of reasoning and beliefs, even though 
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changes to behaviours are important to real-world impacts. Here, using fair trade as a topic, we 
examined the relative impact of implied and explicit misinformation, the relative effectiveness of 
prebunking and debunking in reducing that impact, and incorporated novel behavioural measures 
in addition to the standard questionnaire measures. 
We found that both implied and explicit misinformation increased participants’ reliance 
on misinformation when responding to the questionnaire and when composing a tweet. However, 
only explicit misinformation reliably impacted willingness-to-pay, and none of the included 
factors impacted willingness-to-seek additional information. We also found that both prebunking 
and debunking were able to reduce misinformation reliance, with debunking generally being 
more effective. Moreover, implied misinformation was not more difficult to counteract than 
explicit misinformation, and prebunking was no more effective than debunking for implied 
misinformation. In fact, results suggest that individuals, on average, rely more on explicit 
misinformation than implied misinformation, even if the difficulty of correcting both 
misinformation types did not reliably differ.   
Our results add to a growing literature showing the general utility of both prebunking and 
debunking (e.g., Cook, 2017; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Paynter et al., 2019; van der Linden et al., 
2020), although, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effects of 
prebunking using behavioural measures (for effects of debunking on behavioural measures, see 
Hamby et al. 2020, and MacFarlane et al., 2020). This is also one of the first studies to compare 
directly pre-emptive and retroactive correction interventions, corroborating evidence that 
prebunking may be less effective than debunking (e.g., Brashier et al., 2021; Walter & Murphy, 
2018), rather than evidence suggesting the contrary (e.g., Bolsen & Druckman, 2015; Jolley & 
Douglas, 2017). Critically, we demonstrated that the greater effectiveness of debunking may 
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apply when countering more elaborate misdirection (i.e., going beyond headlines to include 
content with fake experts and anecdotes) with more sophisticated intervention strategies (i.e., 
following best-practice recommendations of debunking and inoculation), to both implied and 
explicit misinformation, and to not just questionnaire measures but also social-media behaviours. 
However, despite showing the potential for literally-true information to mislead, results 
were contrary to expectations in that we did not find implied misinformation more difficult to 
correct. This contrasts with the findings of Rich and Zaragoza (2016). However, we note that our 
interventions were based on best-practice recommendations and thus were likely more 
efficacious than the brief, single-lined negations used by Rich and Zaragoza. Thus, our 
interventions might have overcome factors, such as the otherwise difficult task of noticing 
specific discrepancies between false and factual information, that could have contributed to more 
enduring effects of implied misinformation. All else equal, the finding that individuals rely more 
on explicit misinformation may simply reflect the fact that they received and encoded more 
extensive misleading content. 
More generally, our results again highlight the need for continued influence research to 
go beyond questionnaire measures of memory and reasoning. Indeed, differences between 
conditions tended to be smaller or not statistically reliable when assessed using behavioural 
measures (particularly for willingness-to-purchase measures) compared to the questionnaire 
measures, even if they were numerically in the expected directions. This is consistent with the 
attitude-behaviour gap (e.g., McEachan et al., 2011), and suggests that the links between specific 
beliefs (e.g., fair-trade profits only middlemen) and behavioural outcomes such as product 
demand and social-media behaviours are unlikely to be straightforward.   
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There are clear practical implications. One common reason put forth against the 
correction of misinformation, particularly by official sources or technology platforms, is that 
attempts to do so may backfire and ironically increase individuals’ reliance on misinformation 
(e.g., Smith, 2017). This is in part due to the worry that repeated mentions of misinformation 
during exposure and correction can increase its familiarity, as individuals may assume familiar 
information as facts (e.g., Schwarz et al., 2016). In direct contrast with such concerns, our results 
suggest that well-designed interventions are integral to combating misinformation even if they 
repeat the misinformation (see also Swire-Thompson et al., 2020). Importantly, this appears to be 
the case regardless of the order in which the misinformation and intervention is presented, 
whether the misinformation is implied or explicit, and across outcome measures.  
 Nonetheless, the present study has several limitations and possible extensions. First, 
although our use of multiple novel and exploratory measures is important in offering new 
insights, what it also means is that specific p-values should be interpreted with caution due to the 
number of tests conducted. While our interpretations were guided by the general patterns and 
effect sizes, which appear rather consistent across measures, future research is needed to validate 
and extend current results. This is particularly so for the behavioural tasks, as participants did not 
bid using real money and did not have their tweets actually communicated to others. It is also 
unclear if the recruitment of a convenience sample via an online platform with fixed payment 
rate might have impacted results for the willingness-to-seek measure, as the measure requires 
interested participants to extend their time commitment. Indeed, although there is some evidence 
to suggest that results obtained via auctions may be comparable for hypothetical and real 
monetary incentives (e.g., MacFarlane et al., 2020), there can at times be substantial 
heterogeneity between the two (e.g., Kanya et al., 2019; Voelckner, 2006), which may apply to 
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all our behavioural tasks. We therefore recommend that future research delve deeper into each 
individual measure with larger samples (ideally: not relying on convenience sampling or time-
constrained participants); investigate the role of incentives (e.g., by offering actual monetary 
endowments and products); and incorporate more realistic group-based social-media simulations 
across a range of topics.   
 Finally, we did not account for one main benefit of prebunking, which is that it can protect 
against multiple misinformation encounters using the same misleading strategies, potentially up 
to several months (Maertens et al., 2020). Even with identical intervention content, as in the 
present study, such protective effects may not be possible with debunking. The misinformation 
being encountered first may influence subsequent processing, in that the intervention content 
may be encoded with the expectation of being a retroactive application (i.e., the focus is on 
memory updating and knowledge revision). By contrast, without prior misinformation exposure, 
as in prebunking, the content may be encoded with the expectation of being for future application 
(see also Klein et al., 2010, for a discussion on how future orientation can enhance memory 
encoding and thus recall). If that were the case, it would be premature to claim debunking as the 
superior intervention based on current results. It would also suggest that, even in debunking, we 
should perhaps still orient the audience towards future applications where possible. Follow-up 
research should therefore consider contrasting the generalisability and longevity of debunking 
against prebunking, by introducing novel misinformation across time delays. 
To conclude, existing misinformation research has mainly investigated prebunking and 
debunking in parallel, focussed on explicit but not implied misinformation, and on cognitive 
rather than behavioural outcomes. The present study aimed to offer incremental progress towards 
resolving all three limitations. Contrary to expectations, results suggest that implied 
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misinformation may not be harder to correct than explicit misinformation. Results also suggest 
that debunking may be more effective than prebunking, at least in the short-term, regardless of 
misinformation type and for all outcomes assessed. 
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